Afghanistan Times
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KABUL – In a significant geopolitical shift, the Taliban has intensified its engagement with Iran’s Chabahar Port, signaling a decisive move to reduce Afghanistan’s reliance on Pakistan for trade and transit. Officials from the Islamic Emirate say the decision is aimed at diversifying trade routes and asserting Afghanistan’s sovereign foreign policy direction, amid rising tensions with Islamabad.
The Chabahar Port, jointly developed by India and Iran since 2016 as a strategic alternative to Pakistan’s Gwadar Port, had seen diminished Afghan involvement after the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021. However, worsening relations with Pakistan—including deadly border clashes, mass deportations of Afghan refugees, and accusations of Taliban support for Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)—have pushed the Taliban leadership to re-evaluate their regional priorities.
The Taliban now views participation in the Chabahar Transit Project not only as a practical trade solution but also as a symbolic gesture of distancing from Pakistan’s influence. In November 2023, a high-level Taliban delegation led by Deputy Prime Minister Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar visited Tehran and toured Chabahar, requesting easier Afghan access to global markets via the port. In early 2024, Afghan officials confirmed plans to invest $35 million in Chabahar infrastructure, including commercial and residential projects, marking what appears to be the Islamic Emirate’s first official foreign investment since taking power.
India has also expressed renewed interest in using Chabahar to boost trade with Afghanistan. In March 2024, Indian officials held talks with the Taliban’s foreign minister Amir Khan Muttaqi in Kabul, highlighting New Delhi’s support for expanding trade via the port. Iran, for its part, sees deeper Afghan participation in Chabahar as a means to secure cooperation on border security, water disputes over the Hirmand River, and the status of millions of Afghan refugees inside Iran.
Despite past differences with both Iran and India, the Taliban appears to be pursuing a pragmatic approach, leveraging regional infrastructure projects like Chabahar, the TAPI gas pipeline, and the CASA-1000 electricity corridor to build economic legitimacy. A delegation from Afghanistan’s Ministry of Transport visited Chabahar in March 2024 and called for the opening of an Afghan economic representative office there.
Yet these developments come as the Chabahar project faces new uncertainty. On February 4, 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump signed an executive order reinstating the “maximum pressure” policy on Iran, including a rollback of the 2018 waiver that had exempted Chabahar from sanctions. This could potentially deter broader participation by countries like India and Uzbekistan, though both Iran and the Taliban—already under varying degrees of international isolation—are expected to maintain and possibly deepen their cooperation regardless.
The Taliban’s increased involvement in Chabahar is seen by analysts as a strategic message to Pakistan: that Afghanistan is no longer a client entity but a sovereign actor with multiple foreign policy options. With Iran and India both eager to develop regional trade alternatives, and with the Taliban eager for legitimacy and economic engagement, the Chabahar Transit Project may soon become a new axis of regional alignment—one that Islamabad cannot easily ignore.
